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Abstract 
 
According to Bloomberg, fourteen percent of large firms in the restaurant industry (market 
capitalization greater than $100mm) have activist shareholders. These investors’ goal is to drive 
shareholder value, but whether activist investors accomplish this goal is unclear. The purpose of 
my research is to determine whether activist investors create lasting value in the restaurant 
industry by streamlining organizational efficiency, or whether they ultimately destroy shareholder 
value through cost cutting and firm restructurings. The methodology used involved examining 
stock return data from public firms in the restaurant industry that have been targeted or taken over 
by activists and comparing these returns to the returns of the industry overall. The stock prices 
from each company were analyzed over four different time horizons including: (1) a year before 
the announcement of activist involvement; (2) ten days before and ten days after the 
announcement of activist involvement; (3) a year after the announcement; and (4) up to present 
day. This methodology allows us to see how effective these activist investors have been at 
creating value. If value has been created, the stock price will have gone up when compared to the 
overall industry. If value has been destroyed, the stock price will have declined. The results 
indicate that four of the ten firms analyzed showed higher long-term returns than the overall 
restaurant industry index, and these firms that have outperformed the index have done so by an 
average margin of forty percent. However, forty-five percent of companies have seen negative 
returns since an activist’s involvement was announced. This data suggests that activist 
shareholders’ methods are creating mixed results with some big hits and a fair amount of missed 
targets. This research provides a framework for future research that could shed additional light on 
the impact of activists in other industries and adds to the current debate regarding the effect of 
activist investors in the financial markets. As firms like Bob Evans and Bravo Brio currently 
engage with activists, it is clear that these investors are not leaving this market anytime soon.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction to Activist Investing  
 
Activist investing has been a hot button topic in the financial markets for years. 
As activist investors continue to affect the global marketplace and business structure in 
the United States, their overall effect on companies is still largely in question. Activist 
investors take ownership in a company that they “target”, which is usually one that has 
been struggling, is sitting on cash, or needs to be restructured. Historically, these 
investors encourage and, if they have a large enough ownership, demand that companies 
raise their dividends, cut costs, and increase stock buybacks. Their main purpose is to 
create value for investors. However, what are the ultimate costs of these decisions?  
The debate regarding these controversial investors has two different perspectives. 
On one side, activist investors are criticized for being short-term focused and not helping 
to promote long-term success. Most notably, their focus on restructuring, share buybacks, 
and dividend payouts usually means that the companies that they are controlling have to 
spend more money on satisfying shareholders than investing in innovation and 
development. Many economists argue that this will eventually lead to lower job creation, 
lost economic demand, lower firm value, and, ultimately, weaken the overall economy.  
On the other side of this debate, activist investors are being hailed as capitalistic 
masters of market efficiency. By cutting costs, activist investors improve firm efficiency. 
Much of this change is brought about through flattening the organizational structure, 
removing unnecessary positions, and analyzing the entire corporate structure and balance 
sheet for inefficiencies. Activist investors, in essence, help “trim the fat” in American 
companies. Analysts who follow this school of thought also believe that investors will 
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then take their extra dividends and equity and return that back into the economy by 
investing in other companies, or spending money in the American marketplace. This, 
they would argue, helps improve the economy and strengthens companies by increasing 
efficiency and forcing companies to consolidate for the betterment of their investors. 
The idea behind shareholder and investor activism follows a fairly basic concept. 
Underperforming company’s stock price will be driven down due to the poor 
performance and under-utilization of company resources. This means that outside 
investors, or current investors, will be able to buy these shares for cheaper, and in doing 
so grow their ownership of the company. This will allow these “activists” to gain such a 
large holding that they have a substantial amount of input into the company’s endeavors 
and can even go on to try and hold a board seat. Then, once they have their position and 
have the power to control the company, these activists look to improve business functions 
and drive up share value. This profits them as shareholders in the company, and also 
helps grow the business.  
The restaurant industry in particular is a very active market in terms of activist 
investors. This is for many reasons. For one, restaurants are usually conglomerates of 
many different types of smaller “businesses”. Structurally, restaurant chains are 
composed of many different asset classes. The fast-food and fast-casual restaurants that 
activists have shown a particularly high level of interest in are usually made of at least 
two main pieces. One of these pieces being the brand and the food itself. For instance, 
there is a certain amount of value that is held by a large restaurant chain like Bob Evans 
or Wendy’s. Consumers are familiar with the brand and their signature items. Secondly, 
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these restaurant chains usually have massive real estate holdings as well. When you are a 
restaurant chain that is nationally recognized you will usually have hundreds of real 
estate holdings in each state, along high ways, and even internationally. Many of these 
buildings are in urban settings like downtown New York, which prove to be especially 
valuable, however just the sheer amount of buildings that these companies own is 
sometimes enough to warrant the real estate portion of the company to be spun off. Some 
of these chains also have “side brands” that they hold under the parent company as well. 
For instance, Bob Evans has their main restaurants but then also sell their gravy and some 
breakfast specialties in the frozen sections of many grocery stores. An activist looks at 
these different asset classes and may think that by dividing up these different holdings, 
the company could ultimately create more value for the shareholders. This is one, of 
many ways, that an activist investor may want to change a company that they have a 
holding in, but it is especially profound in the restaurant arena. 
Figure 1 (below) shows the effect that activist investors have had on the overall 
marketplace so far. Taken from the Wall Street Journal, it shows that since 2003, capital 
returns to investors have more than doubled, while capital spending has dropped five 
percentage points. This is a drastic change that highlights how activist investors may 
want companies to spend their money versus how the executives may want to spend. It is 
clear that the priorities of companies are shifting as investors and shareholders benefit 
and long-term investment in capital spending is cut.  
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Figure 1: 
 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-shareholders-1432693805 
 
As the activist investing movement continues to grow and take shape, investors 
and economists alike are trying to predict what the long-term effect of these corporate 
marauders will be. How will these changes in firm spending and actions affect the overall 
economy, employment levels, growth, wages, and, more specifically, each individual 
firms long-term outlook? These questions are all still up in the air, but the restaurant 
industry offers us a potential glimpse into the future due to the high concentration of 
activist activity and composition of the firms.   
In today’s marketplace, activist investing does not show any signs of slowing. 
Figure 2 from J.P. Morgan’s “The Activist Revolution” shows how the dollar amount of 
assets under management for activist hedge funds has seen steady growth since 2009. As 
the number of activist funds and resources available to activists continue to grow, it is 
clear that the effect of these activists will only continue to magnify and intensify in the 
coming years.  
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Figure 2: 
 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320693986586.pdf 
Throughout the rest of this document, you will find my research problem and a 
literature review covering prior research conducted. This will be followed by my 
hypotheses and predictions for my research where I will lay out my specific variables and 
the constructs that I will be using to analyze them. I will then move into my 
methodology, research results, and, lastly my ideas for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Research Problem 
My research will be focusing on the effects of these investors on stock returns 
within the fast food and fast casual restaurant industry. While research regarding activist 
investors effect on stock prices has been done in the past, I plan on specifically focusing 
on restaurant chains and parent companies that have been targeted by activists. My data 
collection will focus on firms that have had varying degrees of activist involvement. 
Some of these firms will have only recently had activist involvement while others may 
have had an activist investor contributing to their business for years. I will be looking to 
see how these firms have performed since the activists announced their involvement 
within the firm. This will offer insight into how these investors have been able to alter 
these companies, and if they have been successful in doing so (as measured by firm stock 
price) 
This research will help publicly-traded companies make investment decisions and 
weigh the pros and cons of allowing activist investors into their boardrooms. It will also 
allow the markets to better estimate the value that will be derived within the fast food/ 
fast casual restaurant industry, or other industry with similar characteristics, when an 
activist investor gets involved in a firm. Lastly, it will show companies the effects of 
shorter term activist involvement versus the long-term effects.  
Either way, this research will help companies decide the best course of action when 
confronted with a potential activist takeover.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
Research regarding the effects of activist investors has shown that adding activist 
investors into the equation leads to increased company stock buybacks, increased 
dividends, and lowered investment in long-term growth solutions. This research has 
shown that, as the activist investor movement has strengthened, company spending has 
shifted significantly. One report from the Wall Street Journal notes that S&P 500 
companies spent over 36% of their cash flows on stock buybacks in the past year, up 
from 18% in 2003. Over that same time period, spending on plants and equipment has 
decreased almost 4% (Monga, Benoit, Francis). In an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, Blackrock CEO Laurence Fink stated, "More and more corporate leaders have 
responded with actions that can deliver immediate returns to shareholders, such as 
buybacks or dividend increases, while underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or 
essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth” (Monga, Benoit, 
Francis). Moody's Investors Service Data also shows that the median percentage of cash 
spent on dividends rose to 11.9% of earnings, from 9.4% in 2013 (Monga Benoit, 
Francis). The data shows a general trend in the way that companies are spending their 
cash. However, what does this do to the ultimate returns for these companies? Will this 
lead to higher stock prices, or lower stock prices? What is the ultimate value gained or 
lost by these actions? 
Activist research has reflected the general disagreements surrounding this 
controversial topic as well. Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang’s “The Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism” collected 2000 cases from 1994-2007 and looked at the effect that 
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activist investors had five years after their intervention. Ultimately, they concluded from 
their data that there was no evidence to back the claim that activist investors had a 
negative effect on stock prices. Instead, they found that stock prices initially had a spike 
upon the announcement of an activist takeover, and that this initial spike was correctly 
reflecting the long-term returns of the investment. This initial spike is shown in their 
research on page 1122 and is shown as Figure 4: 
Figure 4: 
 
 
 To analyze if these initial returns would reverse, the researchers used the CAPM 
and the Fama French Four Factor Model to analyze alphas (stock returns that are not 
explained through movements throughout the market). This group reached the conclusion 
that in the five-year period post-activist takeover, these firms did not face falling stock 
returns, but instead had positive stock returns above the market. This information can be 
shown by the positive alphas shown in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: 
 
 
To gather their cases, this group collected 13D SEC filings, which are the 
mandatory SEC filings that must be submitted in the event of an activist takeover. 
Activist investors are also having an impact on sales general and administrative 
expenses that companies are undertaking, as well as on employment numbers. In Brav, 
Jiang and Kim’s “The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset 
Allocation, and Labor Outcomes” they find that firms see changes in many key 
employment metrics when activist investors get involved. Their research found that total 
hours worked dropped 7.3% two years after an activist became involved in the firm. Over 
this same time period, labor productivity increased by 8.4%. Productivity-adjusted per-
hour wages decreased by 7.3% from the year of activist involvement to three years after 
activist involvement. The research also showed that both number of workers, and number 
of hours worked per worker decreased after an activist became involved. Ultimately, this 
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research suggests that when activists become involved in firms, hours and wages are cut 
in most cases, while productivity rises.  
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses and Predictions 
The main variable being measured in my research is: 
• Stock Returns for restaurants/chains with activist involvement compared to stock 
returns for restaurants/chains with no activist involvement 
• Independent Variable= Time before/after announcement of activist involvement 
• Dependent Variable(s)= Stock returns over the different time intervals 
Measurements of performance and activist "success": 
• Stock returns= (Closing Stock Value- Opening Stock Value)/(Opening Stock 
Value) 
• Covariant 1= Menu ETF (tracks the performance of the restaurant industry as a 
whole) 
• Covariant 2= Five firms returns over the same time intervals that did not have 
activist involvement and are also in the fast food/ fast casual restaurant industry 
What constitutes an activist investor? 
• "A minority shareholder who seeks to influence decision making at a company by 
voicing concerns, engaging in a dialogue with management, or lobbying other 
shareholders for support. The demands could relate to changes in management, 
representation on the board, acquisitions, salaries, bonus payments, use of 
retained earnings, etc." - The Financial Dictionary.com 
• For the purpose of this research, I will define an activist investor as: 
o An individual who has been labeled "activist investor" by the financial 
community/ media 
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o An individual who participates in proxy fights with board of directors 
o An individual looking to change basic functions/ operations of a company 
through stock ownership 
Case Collection and Specific Characteristics for Prime Candidates 
• Companies with "activist takeover" as determined by activist characteristics listed 
above 
• Must be a publicly traded company 
Predictions: 
• For times between the 10 days before announcement and 10 days post 
announcement: 
o I believe that the stock price will see a large jump upon the announcement of 
activist involvement. I predict the stock price will be highest for this period on 
the day of the announcement, and will stay up through the 10 days post 
announcement. 
• For times between 1 year before the announcement and 1 year after the 
announcement: 
o I believe that the stock price will be up one year after the announcement as 
compared to one year before the announcement. Activist investors tend to 
target struggling companies so the stock price may not be in good shape one 
year before the announcement. Also, the one year post announcement horizon 
is short enough that the long-term effects of the announcement and 
involvement will not be realized yet. 
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• For times between the announcement to 1 year after the announcement: 
o I predict that there will be a positive alpha when compared to the overall 
market for the restaurants that have been targeted by activist investors. 
• When compared with Menu ETF returns: 
o I believe that activists will beat the Menu ETF returns over a one year period, 
but after that time frame has passed will be beat by the industry average. 
• When compared to the control firms in the industry that did not have any activist 
involvement: 
o I believe that activists will outperform firms that did not have any activist 
involvement over the different time intervals being studied.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
  
To collect the data necessary for my research, I first had to pinpoint which firms I 
would focus on. To do this, I wanted to take a look at firms in the restaurant industry that 
had been involved with activist investors in the past. These firms had to all be publicly 
traded companies so that their company information and stock prices were readily 
available. To collect the company data, I used multiple different accredited news sources. 
I also used these same resources to make note of the selected firms’ stock prices: 
▪ 1 year before the announcement of activist involvement  
▪ 10 days before the announcement of activist involvement 
▪ At the date of activist involvement 
▪ 10 days after the announcement of activist involvement 
▪ 1 year after the announcement of activist involvement 
After this, I also collected the stock price for all of the selected firms on November 
29, 2016- the date that my research collection ended. Along with the stock information, I 
also included the hedge fund or activist, the size of their holding, the dates of board seats 
being given to the activist, and lastly made note of what the activists value proposition 
was for the firm. After I collected the important dates, activists involved, their holdings, 
and stock prices at the specified dates, I analyzed how stock returns had been effected by 
the involvement of an activist within a firm. By measuring the activists’ ability to drive 
value through stock returns, I will be able to evaluate how successful these investments 
had been for both the company and the investor. As had been shown by the prior 
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research, these activists change the ways that companies spend. If this new spending is 
effective, the stock returns would be expected to increase, if it is not, their share price 
would drop.   
The returns from the data collected around firms with activist investing was then 
compared to an ETF of the restaurant industry as a whole. The Menu ETF tracks the 
overall performance of publicly traded stocks within the restaurant industry. If the firms 
with activist investors had seen higher returns than the ETF over the different time 
periods, then it would be clear that companies with activist involvement outperform the 
industry. By looking at the stock returns from the firm 10 days prior to the announcement 
of activist involvement and 10 days after the announcement of activist involvement, I was 
able to measure how the markets reacted to the news of the activist. If the stock price 
went up, it would mean that investors thought that activists would be able to drive value 
within the firm. If the stock price dropped, it would be clear that investors did not feel 
that the activists would be able to drive effective change within the organization. The 
next step in the process was to compare the stock price one year before the announcement 
to the stock price both at the announcement and one year after the announcement. This 
allows a look at the longer-term effects of the activist. If the share price grew 
substantially one year after the announcement than it had grown one year prior to the 
announcement than the positive effect of the activist would be seen. After this, I noted the 
stock price on November 29, 2016, the last day of my data collection. This date serves as 
the common ending date from which all current firm stock prices will be taken. From 
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here we can see what kind of returns these activists have seen over a longer stretch of 
time.  
Along with the comparison to the Menu ETF, I also compared the stock returns of 
companies with activist investors to the returns of companies without activist investors. I 
compiled a list of five companies in the fast-food/ fast casual that were also publicly 
traded. I measured the returns for each of these 5 firms over the same dates that I 
measured those firms with activist investors involved. This allowed me to pair each of the 
firms with activist involvement with the mean returns of the five firms that did not have 
activist investors over the same time periods. By using pairings to match the appropriate 
time intervals I was able to see if the firms with activist involvement outperformed those 
firms without activist involvement. Once I had the mean returns for the five firms with no 
activist involvement from 10 days before announcement of activist involvement to 10 
days after announcement and one year before announcement of activist involvement to 
one year after, I ran a t-test to compare these returns to the returns of the firms with 
activist investors to see if there was any significant difference in the two groupings 
returns.  
An analysis from the date of the announcement of the activist to one year after the 
announcement was done to measure the alphas of the targeted companies when compared 
to the S&P 500 as a whole. For each firm, the monthly returns where gathered by looking 
at historical stock data for the adjusted close price of the selected stocks. This price 
incorporates all stock splits and dividends. The monthly risk-free rate was then subtracted 
from these monthly returns. The same process was then performed for the S&P 500 index 
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as a whole (monthly returns where gathered over the same dates as they were for the 
targeted firms with activists, and then the risk-free rate for these months was subtracted 
out). Once the returns where found, a regression was run to see if there was any 
difference in the returns for the overall market and the S&P 500. This regression 
provided the alphas for each firm, which measures the difference between the returns by 
the individual companies and the overall market. It also provided the betas, which is a 
measure of systematic risk. Beta looks at how correlated the firm specific stock prices are 
with the overall market prices. A beta of 1 would mean that the market and the stock are 
perfectly correlated. A beta of .5 would mean that the stock is 50% less volatile than the 
overall market.  
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Chapter 6: Data Analysis 
 For my analysis I focused on key stock returns for each firm over different time 
intervals: 
1) Stock return from 1 year before activist announcement to 1 year after 
announcement 
2) Stock return 1 year before activist announcement to Nov. 29, 2016 
3) Stock return from the date of activist announcement to Nov. 29, 2016 
4) Stock return from the date a board seat was acquired to Nov. 29, 2016 
5) Stock return from the date of activist announcement to 10 days after 
6) Stock return from 10 days prior to activist announce to 10 days post 
 
These returns were then compared with the returns of the Menu ETF, whose returns 
were taken on an annual basis (measured on January 1st of each year).  
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Below is the t-test that was run comparing the returns from firms with activist 
involvement to those without from 10 days before an activist’s involvement was 
announced to 10 days after.  
 
Below is the t-test that was run comparing the returns from firms with activist 
involvement to those without from 1 year before an activist’s involvement was 
announced to 1 year after. Only 9 samples were used for this analysis due to timeframe 
limitations. 
 
  The conclusions that we can draw from these t-tests are limited due to the small 
sample size. A true correlation between activist investor involvement and positive or 
negative stock returns cannot be found. Instead we can see that there does seem to be a 
difference between the returns from stocks with activists and stocks without.  
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Looking first at the t-test measuring stock returns for firms 10 days before activist 
announcement to 10 days after, we can see that the mean returns between these two 
different groups over this time interval were 2.1% for firms with activists, and -2.01% for 
firms without activists. This suggests that these firms with activists had higher returns 
around the date of activist announcement that were not seen by other firms within the 
same industry. Ultimately, it seems that firms within the fast-food/ fast casual industries 
do see a jump in their stock prices when an activist investor’s involvement in the 
company is announced that is not seen in other firms over the same time period. This test 
gave a t-statistic of 1.396, however no significance can be proven due to the small sample 
size.  
When looking at the t-test measuring the stock returns of firms 1 year before the 
announcement of activist involvement and 1 year after the announcement of activist 
involvement, we find a difference in the stock return changes between those firms that 
did have activist involvement and those firms that did not. In this case, the mean return 
for firms with activist involvement was 8.7933% while the return for firms without 
activist involvement was 16.1866%. This gave a t-statistic of -3.227. While we cannot 
derive significance from this test due to the small size of the sample, we can note the 
differences between the two samples. This seems to suggest that firms without activist 
investors actually outperformed those firms who had activists driving business decisions. 
Perhaps this means that these “market makers” and “masters of economic efficiency” do 
not drive as much value as the market expects.  
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Analyzing the regressions between the individual stocks and the market revealed 
an average alpha of .0126 for 9 firms that had return data for up to a year after the 
announcement of activists. This is a 1.2 basis point difference between the market and 
firms in the restaurant industry that had activists involved. On average, the restaurants 
that had activist investors involved outperformed the S&P 500 by 1.2 basis points from 
the date of the announcement of the activist to one year after the announcement. The 
average beta was .527, showing that the firms with activist investors were, on average, 
about 48% less volatile than the S&P 500 as a hole over this time period. This shows that 
perhaps activist investors do drive some value, however, due to the sample size, no 
conclusions can be drawn.  
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Chapter 7: Results 
Below is a chart showing the returns since the announcement of activist involvement to 
November 29, 2016. As can be seen, half of the cases actually showed negative returns. 
However, there have been two huge successes in McDonald’s and Cracker Barrel. This 
seems to show that while activist engagement does not always end up creating value, 
when they are able to create the synergies and efficiencies that they expect, the returns 
can be massive.  
 
When looking at the above chart, it is important to recognize that these returns 
have not been seen over the same time frames. The two longest examples of firms with 
activist involvement from the data are McDonald’s (which has the highest returns of any 
of the firms) and Wendy’s. Both of these firms had their starts with activists in 2005. The 
two shortest timeframes for firms with activist involvement in the data are Chipotle and 
Buffalo Wild Wings, who got their start with activists in 2016.  
          The following table highlights the key findings from the data: 
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(*The returns of the Menu ETF were measured on an annual basis on Jan. 1st of each year) 
 
 When looking at the regressions it is important to note that the alpha for the 
individual stock when compared to the S&P 500 is listed as the intercept in the chart and 
the beta is listed as the x-variable. 
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BJ’s Restaurant Regression 
 
 
Darden Restaurant Regression 
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Bob Evan’s Regression 
 
 
Wendy’s Regression 
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McDonald’s Regression 
 
 
Cracker Barrel Regression 
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YUM! Brands Regression 
 
 
Jamba Regression (Engaged Capital) 
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Jamba (JCP Investment Management) 
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Chapter 8: Future Research 
Potential future research includes: 
▪ Using this framework of data collection and analysis to look at other industries 
▪ Combining these results with the results of other industries to increase the sample 
size and potentially derive statistical significance which could aid in finding the 
overall market effect of activist investors on stock returns 
▪ Measure the differences in capital allocation, employment numbers, and dividend 
yields for the firms included in this study to see what type of changes the firms 
saw internally when an activist investor became involved 
▪ Dive deeper into why McDonald’s and Cracker Barrel have been such successful 
endeavors and what separates these two activist campaigns from the others 
▪ Continue to collect data on the observed stocks to see how the alphas change as 
time moves further away from the original announcement of activist involvement 
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